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Pricing cyber insurance for a large-scale network∗
Lei Hua† Maochao Xu‡
Abstract. Facing the lack of cyber insurance loss data, we propose an innovative approach for
pricing cyber insurance for a large-scale network based on synthetic data. The synthetic data is generated
by the proposed risk spreading and recovering algorithm that allows infection and recovery events to
occur sequentially, and allows dependence of random waiting time to infection for different nodes.
The scale-free network framework is adopted to account for the topology uncertainty of the random
large-scale network. Extensive simulation studies are conducted to understand the risk spreading and
recovering mechanism, and to uncover the most important underwriting risk factors. A case study is
also presented to demonstrate that the proposed approach and algorithm can be adapted accordingly
to provide reference for cyber insurance pricing.
Key words: Risk spreading, risk recovering, algorithm, scale-free network.
1 Introduction
Over the recent years, cyber insurance has become increasingly important, as our society has relied more
and more on the cyber domain for almost all aspects of our daily life and work. However, there have
been only a few research works dealing with modeling and assessing cyber risks. Among obstacles that
have prevented the cyber insurance market from achieving maturity, the absence of reliable actuarial
data and the reluctance of revealing IT infrastructures make actuarial modeling even more challenging
(Betterley, 2017; Kosub, 2015; Xu and Hua, 2019).
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Traditionally, rate making relies on actuarial tables constructed from experience studies. Unlike
traditional insurance policies, cyber insurance has no standard scoring systems or actuarial tables.
Cyber risks are relatively new, and there are only a very small amount of data about security breaches
and losses. This difficulty may be further exacerbated by the reluctance of organizations to reveal
the details of security breaches for the sake of avoiding loss of market shares, loss of reputation, etc.
Pricing cyber insurance is still a challenging question although the demand has been increasing and
there are insurance companies providing cyber insurance products. According to Betterley’s report
(Betterley, 2017), the insurers tend to increase premiums for larger companies, and the coverage can be
limited and very expensive for companies without good cyber security protection. The main feature that
distinguishes cyber risks from traditional insurance risks is that the information and communication
technology resources are interconnected in a network, and we are interested in understanding how
interconnected risks might affect each other. Most recently, Xu and Hua (2019) proposed a general
framework for modeling the infection and recovery processes of a network, while accounting for various
costs and risks that might arise from those processes. This method models the cyber risk from a
micro-level perspective, which works very well if the exact network structure is known. However, in
practice it may be unfeasible to extract the exact structure of the network due to the confidentiality
of IT infrastructures, scales, and complexity of real-world networks. For example, the network for
financial transactions of a bank can be extremely complicated, and pricing cyber insurance based on
such a network becomes impractical if one has to know the exact structure of the network. Therefore,
to tackle this challenging issue, we propose a novel approach that models the cyber risk from a macro
level perspective based on some basic specifications of the network. But one should notice that there
are some other factors, such as network design principles, that may affect a network’s susceptibility to
cyber risks.
The most closely related work to cyber risk from the macro level is by Eling and Wirfs (2018), where
they studied the cost of cyber risks by using data from the SAS OpRisk Global data. They adopted
a loss distribution approach which considers the loss frequency and severity, and deployed the extreme
value theory to study the loss distribution. Although this work provides a further understanding of
cyber risks, the network characteristics are not considered, which we believe have significant effects on
the cyber risk of a specific company. Our proposed work aims to provide further understanding on
how network characteristics affect the cyber losses on the macro level. Specifically, for a large-scale
network, instead of knowing the exact structure, which is often unfeasible, one could have some basic
quantities such as the numbers of nodes and edges to describe the basic features of the complex network.
For underwriting purposes, it is more practical if one can consider the premiums without knowing the
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exact structure of the network. Also, the physical network structure is likely different than the network
logical topology which describes how the data flow within the network. To this end, we employ the
scale-free network structures for the mechanism of generating the underling network topology. The so-
called scale-free structures widely exist in the real world, and see Baraba´si (2016) for many real world
examples of scale-free networks. Instead of knowing the exact network structure, we will only need some
network statistics including the number of nodes, the number of edges, and the degree distributions for
abstracting the network. One of our main tasks is to understand how those network features would
affect cyber risks.
We develop a simulation-based approach for assessing potential cyber risks on a large-scale network
given a set of underwriting information. The study in this paper is innovative in the following aspects:
(1) the randomness of networks is accounted for, and only summary information about the network is
required to conduct the simulations; (2) a more reasonable mechanism for the processes of risk infection
and recovery is adapted and implemented, which allows both infection and recovery to continuously
evolve over time, which is a new algorithm different than that in Xu and Hua (2019); (3) an extensive
simulation study based on the implemented simulation algorithms has been conducted, uncovering
insights into how factors such as network features contribute to the frequency and magnitude of cyber
risks.
The paper is then organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the proposed approach and algorithm,
as well as the basic concepts of scale-free networks in Section 2.1. Then a simulation study is conducted
in Section 3 to understand the mechanism of risk spreading and recovering and the statistical effects on
cyber risks. Particularly, in Section 3.2 we report the findings about the statistical effects from various
predictive variables on the cyber risks to uncover the most important underwriting risk factors. Section
4 demonstrates how to use the proposed approach to price a specific large-scale network. Section 5
concludes the paper with further discussions.
2 The proposed approach
Ratemaking for cyber risks on a large-scale network is very challenging, especially considering that the
network topology and risk spreading and recovering mechanism themselves can be very complicated,
there are very few relevant datasets available, etc. In order to address these issues, our approach is
based on synthetic data that can account for a variety of scenarios with respect to network topology,
interactions between infection and recovery activities, and so on.
A loss frequency-severity model based on a large-scale network can be the following. Let G(V,E)
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denote an undirected graph with n nodes represented by V and m edges represented by E. A node
abstracts a computer/server/working station at an appropriate resolution depending on the insuring
interest, and the graph abstracts the communication network of a company.
Let random variables N and Z be the number of loss events during a unit time period and the loss
severity, respectively. For a given graph G and some other covariates XN , the conditional number of
loss events N |(G,XN) ∼ FN |(G,XN )(G, θ), where G is the collection of attributes that are associated with
the graph itself such as number of nodes and edges, and θ is the collection of the parameters for the
other covariates such as average waiting time to infection and to recovery, respectively. Further, the
loss severity Z, such as the cost of replacing a node, does not depend on the network G, and it may
depend on some other predictive variables XZ . For example, the cost of replacing a node is generally an
inconsequential fraction of the cost of a breach event. We can write Z|XZ ∼ FZ|XZ (α), where α is the
collection of parameters for the predictive variables. Let Z1, . . . , Zn be independent copies of Z, and Z
and N are independent. Therefore, the aggregated loss for the graph G can be written as
S|(G,XN , XZ) =
N |(G,XN )∑
i=1
Zi|XZ .
and then
E[S|(XN , XZ)] ≈
|J |∑
j=1
[E[N |(Gj, XN)] · E[Z|XZ ]] /|J |, (1)
where the (G1, . . . , G|J |) is a random sample of G, and a sampling scheme is provided by Goh et al.
(2001) when G is of a scale-free network, J is the collection of indexes, and |J | is its cardinality, i.e., the
number of simulated networks. The variability of S can be assessed similarly based on the simulations.
The approximation in (1) should be sufficiently accurate when J is large enough. We refer to Goh et al.
(2001); Chung and Lu (2002); Cho et al. (2009) for sampling from a scale-free network.
Here we notice that the network topology and the risk spreading scheme are assumed only to affect
the loss frequency, while the loss severity Z does not depend on either the network structure or how
the cyber risks spread. This assumption is reasonable as loss severity (such as the cost of labor and
replacements for recovering a node) has usually been standardized and does not depend on the network
itself. That being said, one of the main tasks of this paper is how to tackle the modeling task for the
loss frequency N |(G,XN), for which both network structures and the cyber risk spreading scheme may
play an important role.
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2.1 Scale-free network
In order to account for the randomness of large-scale network structures, we consider using scale-free
networks as the underling network structures. Please refer to Baraba´si (2016) for a large amount of
examples of scale-free networks in the real word.
When a network is too large and its exact structure is impossible to describe, such as a financial
transaction network and the Internet traffic network, one often uses summary statistics to describe
the structure of the network. Among those summary statistics associated with a network, the number
of nodes, the number of edges, and the degree distribution of the network are the most basic ones.
Roughly speaking, the degree of a node is the number of edges connected to the node, and then the
degree distribution describes how the node degrees are distributed over the network. Let a random
variable K represent the node degrees, and then pk = P[K = k] is the probability mass function of K.
When K follows a power-law distribution in the sense that pk = ak
−γ with constants a > 0 and γ > 0,
the network is referred to as a scale-free network; for most real-world examples of scale-free networks,
the range of the index γ is between 2 and 3 (see, Baraba´si and Albert (1999); Baraba´si (2016)). We
will focus on undirected scale-free networks in this paper, as such a property has been found in many
different commonly-used networks that are relevant to cyber risks, such as the Internet at the router
level and email networks for which two directly connected nodes can communicate with each other in
both directions. We refer to Baraba´si and Albert (1999); Baraba´si (2016) for details about scale-free
networks, and Brandes and Erlebach (2005); Kolaczyk (2009) for terminology and statistical inference
about network analysis.
2.2 A novel model and its related simulation algorithm
Given the number of nodes, the number of edges, and the degree distribution, one can generate networks
from a static scale-free random graph that preserves these given properties (see, Goh et al. (2001); Chung
and Lu (2002); Cho et al. (2009)). Synthetic data, and thus estimated risks associated with the randomly
sampled network, can then be obtained based on a risk spreading and recovering algorithm that is to be
discussed in detail in Appendix. By altering the sets of values of the basic network statistics (n,m, γ),
as well as the cost functions and the assumptions for the infection and recovery processes, one can
assess various cyber risks that are associated with the random network, of which only the basic network
statistics are known. The synthetic data can then be used to calibrate the model developed so that a
flexible enough but simplified pricing model can be developed.
Due to the lack of available data for many of the factors that may affect the cyber risks and
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corresponding losses, our approach and algorithms provide a flexible tool for conducting computer
experiments based on the following factors:
• Number of nodes of the network;
• Number of edges among the nodes;
• Index γ of the scale-free network;
• Number of initially affected nodes;
• Dependence structure among the nodes;
• The distribution of waiting time to infection;
• The distribution of waiting time to recovery.
To keep our framework more general, the infection is defined to be very broad, which can include
infecting a computer by a malware/virus, stealing sensitive information or data breach, or losing control
of computers or certain software (e.g. ransomware, DDOS attacks) etc. The infection time can be
interpreted as the time needed to have/detect an infection. For example, for the data breach as an
infection, the waiting time to infection can be interpreted as the time between two consecutive breaches.
Similarly, the waiting time to recovery is also defined to be very broad depending on the practical
scenario. For the malware infection, the recovery can be interpreted as the time needed to clean the
malware, patch security vulnerabilities, and bring the computer back to a functioning status. For the
data breach, the recovery can be interpreted as the time needed to contain the breach. For example,
the average time to contain a data breach was 69 days in 2018 according to Ponemon Institute (https:
//www.ponemon.org).
Although one may find that colorredsome of these assumptions are not in general easy to specify, the
simulation models at such a level of granularity provide a useful platform for creating synthetic data while
accounting for the uncertainty of those factors. A feasible approach is to consider different possibilities of
those assumptions and then employ the proposed model to conduct simulations. Afterwards, assessment
of potential cyber risks and losses can be done by analyzing the synthetic data. It should be noticed
that we aim to develop an efficient and flexible algorithm for understanding how cyber risks might
evolve on a complex large-scale network. It is out of the scope of the current work for discussing how
to choose those assumptions while no relevant data are available. We believe that those assumptions
can be based on experts’ experiences and/or experienced data (e.g., published reports from Ponemon
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Institute). When the corresponding data is available, the statistical inference for those assumptions
should be a relatively easier task. The proposed approach is suitable for various assumptions and, in
what follows, we will discuss our models and algorithms assuming that the assumptions are given. After
discussing the models, we will conduct simulations and case studies to understand the risk spreading and
recovering mechanism, to uncover the most important underwriting risk factors, and to demonstrate
how to use the proposed approach for pricing a large-scale network, of which the uncertainty of the
assumptions will have been accounted for.
In Boguna´ et al. (2014), a method is proposed for simulating mutually independent non-Markov
stochastic processes. In this paper, we relax the independence assumption and propose a new method
of simulating dependent non-Markov stochastic processes.
The technical details of the proposed model, and the algorithm for simulations are included in the
Appendix. In the following, we briefly summarize the basic idea of the algorithm. Given a network
with nodes (e.g., computers) and links (e.g., cables and/or wireless communication), the proposed
simulation algorithm includes two types of stochastic processes: (1) Recovery process. Each infected
node can be recovered according to a stochastic recovery process. (2) Infection process. Each healthy
node can be infected via the vulnerable link via a stochastic infection process. The status of each node,
being either healthy or infected, is determined by the interaction of these two types of processes. The
proposed algorithm allows all the involved processes to evolve during a certain time period, and allows
the node status to change from one to the other. Based on the algorithm, we can simulate the evolution
of infection over the network, that is, how the infection is spreading and/or recovering over a network
during a time period. Because the assumptions of the stochastic processes as well as the specifications
of the network may affect how the risks are evolving, we can use the algorithm to simulate different
scenarios and generate synthetic data to study risk factors.
3 Simulation study
In this section, we conduct extensive simulation studies to understand how the network characteristics
affect the cyber risks. In Section 3.1, we first conduct an exploratory analysis on a network with a fixed
number of nodes and edges to focus on understanding the risk spreading and recovering mechanism.
Then in Section 3.2, we conduct a formal statistical analysis on the effects of various factors including
the number of nodes, the number of edges, etc..
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3.1 Exploratory analysis
We first carry out simulations to study the source of variability of cyber risks based on networks with
a given number of nodes and edges. Due to its flexible shape and tail behavior, Weibull distribution in
the following form is chosen for both the random time to recovery and the random time to infection.
F (τ) = exp {−(µτ)α} , µ, α > 0.
As in reality, most scale-free networks have the γ parameter in the range of (2, 3), we choose 2.1,
2.5, and 2.9 as three values of γ. For the purpose of simulation, without knowing the exact dependence
structure of a complex network dependence, we can use a multivariate Gaussian copula in order to gain
some basic ideas about how dependence affects overall cyber risks. The following is the cumulative
distribution function (cdf) of a d-dimensional Gaussian copula.
C(u1, . . . , ud) = Φd(Φ
−1(u1), . . . ,Φ−1(ud),Σ),
where Σ is the correlation matrix of the d-dimensional standard multivariate normal cdf Φd, and Φ is
the cdf of the standard univariate normal distribution. The Dk in Equation (4) can then be written as
Dk(u1, . . . , ud) = Φd|k(Φ−1(u1), . . . ,Φ−1(ud);µd|k,Σd|k),
where Φd|k is the cdf of the multivariate normal distribution with mean µd|k = (ρik; i 6= k)> · Φ−1(uk)
and correlation matrix Σd|k, and one can use the R function partial.r{psych} to get the partial
correlation matrix. Because the dependence is about the random waiting time to infection on the
nodes that are connected directly to the infected node, it is reasonable to assume that there is only
positive dependence. Therefore, in what follows, we assume positive dependence in the Gaussian copula
to make the large-scale simulation more tractable. The proposed algorithm was employed to conduct
the simulation analysis. Here we assume that initially there is 1 infected node, and the correlation
coefficient is assumed to be 0.5. These assumptions will be relaxed to be more flexible when we study
the statistical effects from various factors in Section 3.2. Table 1 contains the simulation settings and
the corresponding results for 5 different representative cases.
Based on Cases A, B, and C from Table 1, the values of γ do not have a strong effect on the cyber
risks in terms of the average total service-down per node and per month, denoted as node×month, and
the average total number of recovered nodes. However, based on Cases C, D, and E, both the random
time to infection and the random time to recovery dramatically affect the cyber risks. In particular,
when the time to recovery is not much smaller than that for infection, the cyber risks can be greatly
increased.
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Case n m γ im iv rm rv ns itm itsd rnm rnsd
A 50 200 2.1 1 1 0.25 0.25 800 0.61 1.76 2.72 5.20
B 50 200 2.9 1 1 0.25 0.25 800 0.66 1.73 2.89 5.17
C 50 200 2.5 1 1 0.25 0.25 800 0.56 1.51 2.61 4.60
D 50 200 2.5 1 1 0.5 0.5 800 17.08 50.15 38.30 105.46
E 50 200 2.5 1 1 1 1 800 266.48 195.54 268.97 197.12
Table 1: Effects of network topology on risk assessments. n: number of nodes, m: number of edges,
γ: index of scale-free networks, im: mean of waiting time to infection, iv: variance of waiting time to
infection, rm: mean of waiting time to recovery, rv: variance of waiting time to recovery, ns: number
of simulation for each set of assumptions, itm: sample mean of the total service-down time of the nodes
in the unit of node×month, itsd: sample standard deviation of the total service-down time of the nodes
in the unit of node×month, rnm: sample mean of the total number of nodes that have been recovered,
rnsd: sample standard deviation of the total number of nodes that have been recovered.
Figures 1 illustrates the trajectories of the numbers of infected nodes for Cases A, B and C, re-
spectively with 800 randomly developed trajectories for each case. Note that with the same number of
nodes and the same number of edges, etc., different γ ∈ (2, 3) for the scale-free network does not lead
to significantly different development patterns of the infected nodes. This observation is consistent to
the numbers reported in Table 1 as well.
Figure 2 contains the histograms of the natural logarithm of the accumulated infected node×month
for Cases A, B, and C, respectively. The vertical red dashed lines are the corresponding sample means.
Again, the patterns are quite similar although the γ’s are different.
What we can conclude from the above comparisons is that given that the other factors are the same,
the γ parameter for the scale-free network may not affect the overall cyber risks significantly. In Section
3.2, a further study with various factors such as different number of nodes and different number of edges
involved will suggest that γ is not statistically significant in affecting the cyber risks.
Figure 3 compares the trajectories of the numbers of infected nodes for Cases D and E, respectively
with 800 randomly developed trajectories for each case. Note that with the same number of nodes and
the same number of edges, etc., the random time to infection and the random time to recovery play
a very important role in affecting the process of risk spreading and recovering. Unlike the cases in
Figure 1, Cases D and E here have a relatively slower speed for recovery compared to that for infection.
Therefore, the number of infected nodes significantly increases with time. When the recovery speed
is slow enough, such as in Case E, it is most likely that the number of infected nodes is increasing
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Figure 1: Numbers of infected nodes along time
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Figure 2: Histogram for the natural logarithm of accumulated infected node×month
dramatically until almost all are infected. In this case, the whole network will have a very slim chance
of a complete recovery.
Figure 4 shows the histograms of the natural logarithm of the accumulated infected node×month
for Cases D and E, respectively. The vertical red dashed lines are the corresponding sample means. It
is interesting to note that there tend to be two modes for the distributions of the accumulated infected
node×month when the time to recovery is getting closer to the time to infection, which is clearer in
Case E. The possible reason is that in the network system, the recovery and infection are competing
with each other, and when one of these two competing factors dominates, the whole system tends to be
dominated by such a factor.
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3.2 Statistical effects of network and risk spreading features
In this section, we formally study the statistical effects from various factors on cyber risks based on
synthetic data. The purpose of assessing the statistical effects from various factors is to identify those
important variables that have to be included in the candidate models for pricing cyber risk insurance.
Our approach is to randomly choose the values of the parameters associated with the model, and then
simulations are conducted to generate synthetic data for further statistical analysis. We have generated
a random sample of size 800 within the time frame T = 12. The following predictive variables are
considered:
• par cop: the common correlation coefficient ρ of the Gaussian copula (from 0.1 to 0.9);
• mean rec: the population mean of the Weibull distribution for the random waiting time to re-
covery (from 0.1 to 1);
• var rec: the population variance of the Weibull distribution for the random waiting time to
recovery (from 0.1 to 1);
• mean inf: the population mean of the Weibull distribution for the random waiting time to infec-
tion (from 0.1 to 6);
• var inf: the population variance of the Weibull distribution for the random waiting time to
infection (from 0.1 to 6);
• Nnode: number of nodes (from 20 to 100);
• Nedge: number of edges (from 80 to 400);
• Gam: the γ parameter for the scale-free network (from 2 to 3);
• Ninf0: initial number of infected nodes (from 1 to 5).
In order to check that the predictive variables are roughly balanced and mutually independent,
we first standardize them except for the variable Ninf0, and then draw the scatter plots. Figure 5
contains the scatter plots of randomly chosen 100 points for these covariates, and there seem to be no
multicolinearity and the data are roughly balanced.
There are two main response variables that are of interest: Tinf, the accumulated infected node×month,
and Nrec, the accumulated number of recovered nodes, and these two variables directly affect the amount
of losses. For example, Tinf may lead to losses due to the shut down of services, and Nrec is directly
associated with repair and replacement costs which however are not generally significant costs of a cyber
insurance claim.
Based on the ranges of the predictive variables, we use some strictly increasing transformations such
as the logit and natural logarithm functions to make the ranges of the variables be (−∞,∞) to have
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Figure 5: Scatter plots of standarlized covariates
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relatively stable numerical performance when regression analyses are conducted with computer software.
Please refer to Tables 2 and 4 for the details on how such transformations were employed, and their
corresponding estimates.
3.3 Effects on the accumulated infected nodes and time
For the response variable Tinf, we have tried several different models such as linear models and gen-
eralized linear models based on the gamma distribution and the inverse Gaussian distribution. After
trying the Box-Cox transformation with the help of the R function boxcox(), we find that the optimal
value of λ of the Box-Cox transformation is −0.02 for the data. Since this value is very close to 0,
we can simply transform the response variable by the natural logarithm. Afterwards, a multiple linear
regression can be used to assess the effects of the predictive variables. The following linear regression
model was chosen to assess the effects of the predictive variables.
ln(Tinf) ~ logit(par_cop)+ln(mean_rec)+ln(mean_inf)+ln(var_rec)+ln(var_inf)+
ln(Nnode)+ln(Nedge)+logit(Gam-2)+Ninf0
Tables 2 and 3 are the corresponding estimates and the ANOVA table, respectively. There are several
interesting findings suggested by the analysis. First, from Table 3 we find that the means of the recovery
time and the infection time contribute most to the variability of the accumulated infected node×month,
and the initial number of infected nodes plays a relatively important role. However, after controlling
for the other variables, the number of nodes and the number of edges in the network do not affect the
response variable as much as the aforementioned leading factors do. This suggests that the assumptions
about the average recovery and infection time are the most critical ones, while the network features
such as the number of nodes, the number of edges, and the γ parameter are relatively less important.
Second, the dependence parameter does play a role here although it is not very important. Under such
a simulation setting, a more mutually dependent network tends to lead to a relatively smaller Tinf;
see Table 2. A reasonable interpretation is related to Equation (5), where relatively stronger upper tail
dependence might lead to a larger value of Φ(τ |{tjs , rj}), thus a larger probability that no infection
occurs in the next time period of τ . However, in general there are no deterministic results about the
direction of the effect from dependence. Third, the directions of the effects from the significant predictive
variables are consistent to our intuition based on Table 2. For example, a larger time to recovery and
a smaller time to infection tend to increase Tinf, and a larger number of initially infected nodes tends
to increase Tinf as well. Fourth, as we have already observed from Section 3, the γ parameter for the
15
scale-free network is not significant at all after controlling all the other variables, which removes our
concerns about the influence from the index of scale-free networks.
Estimate SE t-value p-value
(Intercept) 0.2972 1.0700 0.2777 0.781293
logit(par cop) -0.2512 0.0607 -4.1402 0.000038 ***
log(mean rec) 1.9968 0.1208 16.5258 < 2.2e-16 ***
log(mean inf) -1.3011 0.0857 -15.1792 < 2.2e-16 ***
log(var rec) -0.4671 0.1121 -4.1650 0.000035 ***
log(var inf) 0.1017 0.1090 0.9325 0.351360
log(Nnode) 0.4421 0.1689 2.6169 0.009044 **
log(Nedge) -0.1778 0.1508 -1.1786 0.238931
logit(Gam - 2) -0.0607 0.0388 -1.5646 0.118086
Ninf02 1.2327 0.2345 5.2576 1.9e-7 ***
Ninf03 2.0192 0.2376 8.4981 < 2.2e-16 ***
Ninf04 2.2612 0.2349 9.6271 < 2.2e-16 ***
Ninf05 2.4142 0.2760 8.7481 < 2.2e-16 ***
Table 2: Estimates of the regression coefficients for Tinf, and the reference level of the categorical
variable is Ninf0 = 1
3.4 Effects on the accumulated recovered nodes
For the response variable Nrec, we have tried generalized linear models based on the Poisson and the
negative binomial distributions, respectively. A test of overdispersion proposed in Cameron and Trivedi
(1990) indicates that the negative binomial is more suitable, for which we employed the R function
dispersiontest() in the AER package. The following negative binomial model was chosen to assess the
effects of the predictive variables.
Nrec ~ logit(par_cop)+ln(mean_rec)+ln(mean_inf)+ln(var_rec)+ln(var_inf)+
ln(Nnode)+ln(Nedge)+logit(Gam-2)+Ninf0
Tables 4 and 5 are the corresponding estimates and the Type III analysis, respectively. The patterns
of the effects from the predictive variables on Tinf are quite similar to those on Nrec. For instance,
based on Table 5, average infection time and recovery time contribute most to the variability of the
16
DF SumSq RSS AIC F-value p-value
<none> 2797.1 1027.4
logit(par cop) 1 60.92 2858.1 1042.6 17.1417 0.000038 ***
log(mean rec) 1 970.65 3767.8 1263.7 273.1025 < 2.2e-16 ***
log(mean inf) 1 818.92 3616.1 1230.8 230.4096 < 2.2e-16 ***
log(var rec) 1 61.66 2858.8 1042.8 17.3473 0.000035 ***
log(var inf) 1 3.09 2800.2 1026.3 0.8696 0.351360
log(Nnode) 1 24.34 2821.5 1032.3 6.8480 0.009044 **
log(Nedge) 1 4.94 2802.1 1026.8 1.3890 0.238931
logit(Gam - 2) 1 8.70 2805.8 1027.9 2.4479 0.118086
Ninf0 4 448.45 3245.6 1138.4 31.5439 < 2.2e-16 ***
Table 3: ANOVA analysis for Tinf
accumulated number of recovered nodes, and after controlling the other variables, the number of nodes
and the number of edges in the network do not affect Nrec as much as the leading factors. This again
suggests that the assumptions about the average recovery and infection time are the most critical ones.
Moreover, the γ parameter again does not play a significant role. Like the case for Tinf, the dependence
parameter also plays a significant role with stronger dependence leading to fewer recovered nodes.
4 Case study
In Section 3, we used a relatively smaller network to study the statistical effects of various factors.
However, when the network of interest is much larger, one needs to conduct simulations accordingly
based on the actual specification of interest. In this section, we consider a particular case of much
larger networks, and demonstrate how the potential cyber risks can be assessed under the proposed
framework, and how to use the proposed model for pricing cyber insurance for a large-scale network.
The following are the assumptions considered for this particular example.
1. The target market is large networks with 100 to 5000 nodes and the number of edges from 400 to
20000 edges.
2. The network is a scale-free network, and the λ parameter is from 2 to 3.
3. The policy term is 12 months (T = 12).
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Estimate SE t-value p-value
(Intercept) 2.0887 0.7393 2.8251 0.004726 **
logit(par cop) -0.3592 0.0419 -8.5817 < 2.2e-16 ***
log(mean rec) 0.8462 0.0850 9.9593 < 2.2e-16 ***
log(mean inf) -2.3463 0.0583 -40.2360 < 2.2e-16 ***
log(var rec) -0.2237 0.0765 -2.9253 0.003441 **
log(var inf) 0.4216 0.0747 5.6400 1.7e-8 ***
log(Nnode) 0.0997 0.1161 0.8590 0.390343
log(Nedge) 0.3485 0.1041 3.3474 0.000816 ***
logit(Gam - 2) -0.0063 0.0268 -0.2367 0.812924
Ninf02 0.0889 0.1640 0.5421 0.587720
Ninf03 0.5082 0.1654 3.0731 0.002118 **
Ninf04 0.7928 0.1631 4.8621 0.000001 ***
Ninf05 0.6543 0.1898 3.4478 0.000565 ***
Table 4: Estimates of the regression coefficients for Nrec, and the reference level of the categorical
variable is Ninf0 = 1
DF Deviance AIC LRT p-value
<none> 894.0 6182.0
logit(par cop) 1 965.0 6251.0 70.970 < 2.2e-16 ***
log(mean rec) 1 988.0 6273.0 93.530 < 2.2e-16 ***
log(mean inf) 1 2259.0 7545.0 1364.690 < 2.2e-16 ***
log(var rec) 1 903.0 6188.0 8.480 0.0036 **
log(var inf) 1 921.0 6206.0 26.520 2.6e-7 ***
log(Nnode) 1 895.0 6181.0 0.640 0.4226
log(Nedge) 1 905.0 6190.0 10.090 0.0015 **
logit(Gam - 2) 1 895.0 6180.0 0.060 0.8123
Ninf0 4 935.0 6215.0 40.960 2.7e-8 ***
Table 5: Type III analysis for Nrec
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4. The waiting time to both infection and recovery follows a Weibull distribution. Moreover, the
average and the standard deviation of the random time to recovery are from 0.1 to 1 month,
respectively, and those of the random time to infection are from 0.1 to
√
6 months, respectively.
5. The dependence structure among the random waiting time to infection of the nodes that are linked
to the same affected node is a Gaussian copula with the pairwise correlation coefficient ρ, which
can take a value from 0.1 to 0.9.
6. The cost of recovering a node is η and the loss of service interruption per node×month is ω.
Note that the above assumptions cover a very wide range of different cases considering the following
aspects: (a) The numbers of nodes and edges are quite flexible; (b) Only the distribution family for
the random waiting time is assumed, and the mean and variance can be chosen based on the real
applications; (c) The dependence structure covers a wide range of positive dependence.
Similarly to the study in Section 3.2, we first generate synthetic data based on the above assumptions,
and the sample size is 1200. We have checked that there are no multicolinearity of the covariates and
the data are balanced across different variables.
For Tinf, Box-Cox transformation is applied to transform the response variable Tinf to roughly
follow a normal distribution. A multiple linear regression model is then fitted with all the covariates
being included, and the ANOVA table is Table 6. It suggests that the following variables do not
contribute significantly to the model: par cop, var inf, Nnode, Nedge, and Gam.
Then we exclude those insignificant variables except var inf as by all means we need to include it
as otherwise the exact distribution for the random waiting time to infection cannot be specified. Then
the estimated parameter λˆ = 0.1818182 for the Box-Cox transformation for the candidate model, and
the estimates and the ANOVA table are Table 8 and Table 7, respectively.
For Nrec, Poisson regression and the negative binomial regression have been compared, and the
overdispersion test suggests that the negative binomial regression model is more suitable. An initial
model with all the variables included leads to the Type III analysis shown in Table 9. It can be seen that
par cop, var rec, and Nnode do not contribute to the deviance significantly; although the variables
Nedge and Gam appear to be statistically significant, they contribute only marginally to the deviance.
Based on the above consideration, we choose the same set of predictive variables for the candidate model
for the response variable Nrec as that for Tinf, and the model is as follows:
Nrec ~ ln(mean_rec)+ln(mean_inf)+ln(var_rec)+ln(var_inf)+Ninf0.
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DF SumSq RSS AIC F-value p-value
<none> 1638.8 400.0
logit(par cop) 1 4.58 1643.4 401.3 3.3153 0.0689 .
log(mean rec) 1 802.33 2441.1 876.2 581.1431 < 2.2e-16 ***
log(mean inf) 1 37.41 1676.2 425.0 27.1004 2.3e-7 ***
log(var rec) 1 41.73 1680.5 428.1 30.2284 4.7e-8 ***
log(var inf) 1 0.00 1638.8 398.0 0.0034 0.9538
log(Nnode) 1 0.06 1638.8 398.0 0.0412 0.8392
log(Nedge) 1 0.83 1639.6 398.6 0.6037 0.4373
logit(Gam - 2) 1 0.00 1638.8 398.0 0.0001 0.9943
Ninf0 4 754.20 2393.0 846.3 136.5708 < 2.2e-16 ***
Table 6: ANOVA table for Tinf: case study with all variables included
DF SumSq RSS AIC F-value p-value
<none> 1644.0 395.8
log(mean rec) 1 815.84 2459.8 877.3 591.0427 < 2.2e-16 ***
log(mean inf) 1 42.22 1686.2 424.2 30.5871 3.9e-8 ***
log(var rec) 1 40.52 1684.5 423.0 29.3540 7.3e-8 ***
log(var inf) 1 0.00 1644.0 393.8 0.0028 0.9577
Ninf0 4 760.96 2405.0 844.3 137.8215 < 2.2e-16 ***
Table 7: ANOVA table for Tinf: case study with the candidate model
Then the estimated regression parameters and Type III analysis are reported in Table 11 and Table
10, respectively.
Now that we have Table 8 and Table 11, the estimates for the respective candidate model for Tinf
and Nrec respectively, the expected total loss can then be estimated as
E[S] = ω · E[Tinf] + η · E[Nrec]. (2)
Knowing the values of ω and η, the predicted total loss Sˆ can be trivially calculated based on
Equation (2). Table 12 contains the predicted Tinf and Nrec, and their standard errors. The last two
columns of the table are based on the case where the values of ω and η are specified, for which a detailed
discussion follows.
In order to assess the standard error of Sˆ, one needs to consider the covariance between T̂inf and
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Estimate SE t-value p-value
(Intercept) 0.0171 0.1192 0.1435 0.885955
log(mean rec) 1.4782 0.0608 24.3114 < 2.2e-16 ***
log(mean inf) -0.3380 0.0611 -5.5306 3.9e-8 ***
log(var rec) -0.3167 0.0585 -5.4179 7.3e-8 ***
log(var inf) 0.0027 0.0505 0.0530 0.957732
Ninf02 0.7874 0.1030 7.6421 4.4e-14 ***
Ninf03 1.4568 0.1070 13.6147 < 2.2e-16 ***
Ninf04 1.8960 0.1054 17.9819 < 2.2e-16 ***
Ninf05 2.1917 0.1081 20.2765 < 2.2e-16 ***
Table 8: Estimates for Tinf: case study with the candidate model
N̂rec. A theoretically ideal method is to model the covariance between Tinf and Nrec conditioning
on different values of the predictive variables. However, the scatter plot (see Figure 6) between them
indicates that the dependence is very strong, and the calculated correlation coefficient is about 0.88.
Under such a situation, a conservative method can be used to assess the standard error of Sˆ. That
is, consider an upper bound of the covariance between T̂inf and N̂rec. Therefore, by Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality,
var(S) ≤ ω2var(Tinf) + η2var(Nrec) + 2ωη
√
var(Tinf)var(Nrec).
For example, assume that ω = 50k usd and η = 20k usd, then the predicted Sˆ and its standard error
can be calculated as the last two columns of Table 12.
Through such a case study we have some interesting findings. First, the number of nodes and the
number of edges may not be that important on determining the overall cyber risks under the proposed
framework and the assumptions. This may be because the numbers of nodes and edges are already
large enough to allow cyber risks to spread and recover freely. The most important factors are how fast
the risks are spreading, how fast the infected nodes are recovered, and how many nodes have initially
been infected. The estimates of the overall cyber risks can be very sensitive to the changes of those
factors. Second, although the dependence structure may affect the overall risks, it plays a marginal
role. There are two aspects we should notice about the role of dependence structures: On the one
hand, the dependence structure is assumed only on the random waiting time to infection, and in reality
dependence among other factors may exist; on the other hand, there are no deterministic results about
the direction of the effects from the dependence structure; it might increase or decrease the overall risks
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Figure 6: Scatter plots for Tinf and Nrec in the case study
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DF Deviance AIC LRT p-value
<none> 946.0 5581.0
logit(par cop) 1 946.0 5579.0 0.240 0.6276
log(mean rec) 1 991.0 5624.0 44.930 2.0e-11 ***
log(mean inf) 1 1474.0 6107.0 528.510 < 2.2e-16 ***
log(var rec) 1 946.0 5579.0 0.390 0.5322
log(var inf) 1 979.0 5612.0 32.900 9.7e-9 ***
log(Nnode) 1 948.0 5581.0 2.480 0.1156
log(Nedge) 1 951.0 5584.0 5.030 0.0249 *
logit(Gam - 2) 1 950.0 5583.0 4.320 0.0376 *
Ninf0 4 1403.0 6030.0 457.090 < 2.2e-16 ***
Table 9: Type III analysis for Nrec: case study with all variables included
DF Deviance AIC LRT p-value
<none> 946.0 5584.0
log(mean rec) 1 988.0 5624.0 42.300 7.8e-11 ***
log(mean inf) 1 1488.0 6123.0 541.450 < 2.2e-16 ***
log(var rec) 1 947.0 5582.0 0.590 0.4439
log(var inf) 1 981.0 5616.0 34.530 4.2e-9 ***
Ninf0 4 1400.0 6029.0 453.460 < 2.2e-16 ***
Table 10: Type III analysis for Nrec: case study with candidate model
under the current framework.
5 Concluding remarks
Facing the shortage of credible data for pricing cyber insurance for a large-scale network, we propose a
novel approach based on synthetic data that are generated from a flexible risk spreading and recovering
algorithm. The proposed algorithm is able to handle the following scenarios: it allows infection and
recovery to occur sequentially over the term, and it allows dependence among the random waiting time
to infection. The proposed approach provides a more practical way for assessing the cyber risks of a
large-scale network, while only requiring a reasonably small set of underwriting information.
After a large amount of simulation studies and a case study, we find that pricing cyber insurance for
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Estimate SE t-value p-value
(Intercept) 1.6069 0.0782 20.5405 < 2.2e-16 ***
log(mean rec) 0.2595 0.0395 6.5670 5.1e-11 ***
log(mean inf) -0.8514 0.0370 -23.0366 < 2.2e-16 ***
log(var rec) -0.0291 0.0374 -0.7783 0.436419
log(var inf) 0.1917 0.0325 5.8995 3.6e-9 ***
Ninf02 0.3607 0.0744 4.8499 0.000001 ***
Ninf03 0.7532 0.0739 10.1854 < 2.2e-16 ***
Ninf04 1.0551 0.0708 14.9104 < 2.2e-16 ***
Ninf05 1.3013 0.0715 18.1869 < 2.2e-16 ***
Table 11: Estimates for Nrec: case study with candidate model
a large-scale network the following factors are the most important ones that deserve higher attention
and priority: random waiting time to infection and to recovery, and the number of infected nodes at
the beginning of the term. Of these three factors, time to recovery could be estimated based on the
underwriting inquiry or the empirical data, and the number of infected nodes at the beginning of the
term could be related to some score system that evaluates overall vulnerability of the network as a
whole to the outside networks. The other factors, such as the number of nodes, the number of edges,
and the degree of the scale-free network, are much less important compared to those leading factors.
This conclusion at least holds within the conducted studies and assumptions, and for that to hold under
other scenarios, we think that the number of initially affected nodes should be much smaller than the
number of the nodes and edges of the whole network, to allow risk spreading and recovery without
constraint coming from the network topology itself.
A potential limitation of the proposed risk spreading and recovery algorithm is that it does not
account for self-infection, such as infections from USB flash drive attacks, an infection without linking
to any other nodes. Under an intranet environment or some other internal networks with restricted
access to USB flash drives and any other outside networks, the issue becomes minimal. Otherwise,
practically one can either artificially add one node connected by one edge to each existing node for the
simulations, or use the aforementioned overall vulnerability score system to factor the self-infection risks
in.
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mean rec mean inf var rec var inf Ninf0 T̂inf s.e. N̂rec s.e. Sˆ (k usd) s.e.
0.2 1 0.2 1 1 0.105 0.020 3.442 0.284 74.075 6.665
0.4 1 0.2 1 1 0.408 0.057 4.121 0.319 102.807 9.205
0.2 2 0.2 1 1 0.073 0.013 1.908 0.151 41.788 3.699
0.4 2 0.2 1 1 0.307 0.040 2.284 0.164 61.047 5.257
0.2 1 0.2 1 2 0.306 0.047 4.937 0.393 114.061 10.215
0.4 1 0.2 1 2 0.960 0.114 5.910 0.440 166.231 14.485
0.2 2 0.2 1 2 0.227 0.034 2.737 0.207 66.094 5.811
0.4 2 0.2 1 2 0.755 0.081 3.276 0.222 103.249 8.500
0.2 1 0.2 1 3 0.663 0.090 7.311 0.571 179.394 15.934
0.4 1 0.2 1 3 1.814 0.196 8.752 0.645 265.754 22.678
0.2 2 0.2 1 3 0.512 0.066 4.052 0.297 106.664 9.263
0.4 2 0.2 1 3 1.464 0.143 4.851 0.322 170.233 13.595
0.2 1 0.2 1 4 1.045 0.131 9.887 0.761 249.976 21.755
0.4 1 0.2 1 4 2.655 0.265 11.835 0.851 369.451 30.274
0.2 2 0.2 1 4 0.824 0.099 5.480 0.398 150.793 12.926
0.4 2 0.2 1 4 2.174 0.199 6.560 0.426 239.906 18.489
0.2 1 0.2 1 5 1.390 0.171 12.647 0.990 322.462 28.335
0.4 1 0.2 1 5 3.382 0.337 15.140 1.117 471.913 39.197
0.2 2 0.2 1 5 1.110 0.130 7.010 0.509 195.697 16.647
0.4 2 0.2 1 5 2.794 0.253 8.391 0.549 307.545 23.619
Table 12: Predicted Tinf and Nrec, and the total loss for a special case
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Appendix
Algorithms for simulating cyber risks spreading and recovering
First of all, we define an active link as the link that satisfies the following two conditions: (1) exactly
two nodes are connected by the link; (2) exactly one of the two nodes is infected. For a given infected
node j, its k-th active link is indexed by jk. Assume that there are M infected nodes at time t, and the
set of the indexes of the infected nodes is denoted as I. Each infected node generates a recovery process
with the random waiting time to recovery represented by Rj with the survival function Gj(r), j ∈ I.
Each active link generates an infection process with the random waiting time to infection represented by
Tjk with the survival function F jk(t), j = 1, . . . ,M , and for each given j, k = 1, . . . , kj, where kj is the
number of active links associated with the infected node j; define Aj the set of active links associated
with the jth infected node. Let N represent the total number of active links, and then N =
∑M
j=1 kj.
A reasonable assumption is that the infection processes from the same infected node are assumed
to be dependent; that is, Tj1 , . . . , Tjkj are dependent and their dependence structure can be modeled
by a copula C. Specifically, assume that the infected node j launches attacks (through active links) to
its susceptible neighbors {j1, . . . , jkj}. Then (Tj1 , Tj2 , . . . , Tjkj ) is assumed to have the following joint
survival function
F j(tj1 , . . . , tjkj ) = Cj
(
F j1 (tj1) , . . . , F jkj (tjkj )
)
.
Then, the joint survival function for all the Tjks is
F (tjs , j ∈ I, s ∈ Aj) =
M∏
j=1
F j(tj1 , . . . , tjkj ) =
M∏
j=1
Cj
(
F j1 (tj1) , . . . , F jj(tjkj )
)
. (3)
Figure 7: Illustration about elapsed time {tjs} and τ
Given the time {tjk}, j ∈ I, k ∈ Aj have elapsed since these active links have been activated, and
the time {rj}, j ∈ I have elapsed since these nodes have been infected, the probability that the next
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infection corresponds to process ik and will occur at time tik + τ can be represented as follows, where
Dik(u1, . . . , uki) := ∂Ci(u1, . . . , uki)/∂uk.
φ(τ, ik|tjs , rj, j ∈ I, s ∈ Aj)
= lim
∆→0
P (Tik ∈ (tik + τ, tik + τ + ∆), Tjs > tjs + τ, j 6= i, s 6= k,Rw > rw + τ, w ∈ I
|Tjs > tjs , Rj > rj, j ∈ I, s ∈ Aj) /∆
=
lim∆→0 P (Tik ∈ (tik + τ, tik + τ + ∆), Tjs > tjs + τ, j 6= i, s 6= k,Rw > rw + τ, w ∈ I) /∆
P (Tjs > tjs , Rj > rj, j ∈ I, s ∈ Aj)
= Dik
(
F i1(ti1 + τ), . . . , F iki (tiki + τ)
)
fik(tik + τ)
×
∏
j∈I Gj(rj + τ)∏
j∈I Gj(rj)
×
∏
j∈I\{i}Cj
(
F j1(tj1 + τ), . . . , F jkj (tjkj + τ)
)
∏
j∈I Cj
(
F j1(tj1), . . . , F jkj (tjkj )
)
=:
Dik
(
F i1(ti1 + τ), . . . , F iki (tiki + τ)
)
fik(tik + τ)
Ci
(
F i1 (ti1 + τ) , . . . , F iki (tiki + τ)
) × Φ(τ |tjs , rj, j ∈ I, s ∈ Aj)
=: λik
(
F i1(ti1 + τ), . . . , F iki (tiki + τ)
)
× Φ(τ |tjs , rj, j ∈ I, s ∈ Aj) (4)
where
Φ(τ |{tjs , rj}) := Φ(τ |tjs , rj, j ∈ I, s ∈ Aj)
=
∏
j∈I Gj(rj + τ)∏
j∈I Gj(rj)
×
∏
j∈I Cj
(
F j1 (tj1 + τ) , . . . , F jkj (tjkj + τ)
)
∏
j∈I Cj
(
F j1(tj1), . . . , F jkj (tjkj )
) , (5)
and it represents the probability that no infection occurs in the next time period of length τ , given that
the time {tjs}s have elapsed for those active links, and the time {rj}s have elapsed for those infected
nodes.
Similarly, the probability that the next recovery corresponds to the node i and will occur at time
ri + τ can be represented as follows
φ(τ, i|tjs , rj, j ∈ I, s ∈ Aj) =
gi(ri + τ)
Gi(ri + τ)
× Φ(τ |{tjs , rj}) =: Λi(ri + τ)× Φ(τ |{tjs , rj}), (6)
where gi is the density function of Gi. Given the occurrence time τ , the probability that the next
occurring infection event belongs to process ik is
pik =
λik∑
j∈I,s∈Aj λjs +
∑
j∈I Λj
, (7)
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and the probability that the next recovery event belongs to node i is
pi =
Λi∑
j∈I,s∈Aj λjs +
∑
j∈I Λj
. (8)
Note that the Cj here is the copula for the active links associated with the infected node j. When
there is only one active link, the copula is not required but the marginal survival function should be
kept; that is, Cj(F j1(tj1 + τ)) ≡ F j1(tj1 + τ). For the situation when an infected node, say j, does not
have any active link, that is, Aj = ∅, we let Cj ≡ 1. The following Algorithm 1 illustrates how cyber
risks spread and recover continuously on a network.
The reason for Item 3 of Algorithm 1 is that Φ(τ |{tjs , rj}) represents the probability that no event
occurs during the next time length τ . Therefore, 1−Φ(τ |{tjs,rj}) represents the probability that at least
one event occurring during the next time length τ . Generate u from the uniform distribution U(0, 1),
and solve τ as follows to derive the time length.
1− Φ(τ |{tjs , rj}) = u ∼ U(0, 1).
Note that, given that an event happens, we then need to know which process it corresponds to, and this
can be calculated based on Equations (7) and (8).
In Figure 8, we illustrate the interaction of the infection process and the recovery process for a
network with 10 nodes and 15 edges. We let the infection propagate and the infected nodes recover
by themselves until all the nodes are recovered. At each time when there is an event, either infection
or recovery, the nodes in red are infected and the others are healthy. The average recovery time is
assumed to be 0.8 and the average infection time is assumed to be 1. Therefore, the network tends to be
completely recovered eventually, although this is not guaranteed according to the randomness of both
the infection and the recovery processes.
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Algorithm 1 Simulation based on exact networks
INPUT: Network topology A; time span of simulation study T ; the iteration limit; initial states of
nodes; initial elapsed time t0; dependence structures C(|θ); active link infection distribution; recovery
distribution.
1: for i = 1 to iteration limit do
2: while t ≤ T and the number of infected nodes > 0 do
3: Generate a u from U(0, 1), and then solve τ according to (5) Φ(τ |{tjs , rj}) = u; update the
system time by adding the derived time τ .
4: For the active links and the infected nodes, calculate the λik and Λi, respectively, based on the
equations (4) and (6), and thus the probabilities of (7) and (8).
5: Based on the probabilities derived above, randomly sample the index corresponding to which
event – either infection or recovery – that occurs.
6: if Infection occurs then
7: Change the corresponding infected node status from 0 to 1; change the status of the corre-
sponding active link from 1 to 0; assign the newly infected node with elapsed time 0.
8: else
9: Change the corresponding recovered node status from 1 to 0.
10: end if
11: Update the matrix representing the active links; update the elapsed time for each active link
and each infected node, respectively.
12: Update the current time t← t+ t1
13: return t, node status, matrix for the active links, elapsed time for the active links and for the
infected nodes.
14: end while
15: end for
OUTPUT: Node status, matrix for the active links, elapsed time for the active links and for the infected
nodes right after each infection or recovery event.
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Figure 8: Evolution of infection and recovery
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